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Abstract
Investigating how lending programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) af-
fect poverty and inequality, we explicitly address model uncertainty. We control for
endogenous selection into IMF programs using data on 86 low- and middle income
countries for the 1982-2009 period and analyze program effects on various poverty
and inequality measures. The results rely on averaging over 90 specifications of
treatment effect models and indicate adverse short-run effects of IMF agreements
on poverty and inequality for the whole sample, while for a 2000-2009 subsample
the results are reversed. There is evidence that significant short-run effects might
disappear in the long-run.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to provide assistance to
all of its members, its field of action shifted towards the support of developing countries
especially since the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982. This shift in the IMF’s clientele
created demand for a change in the Fund’s adjustment policies and new, concessional
lending facilities emerged. As rumors grew loud that the Fund’s adjustment programs
worsened the situation of the poor in recipient countries,1 the Fund departed from its
neutral position on poverty issues and included poverty alleviation in its agenda (Collier
& Gunning 1999, IMF 2012a, Polak 1991). This raised the question whether IMF pro-
grams contribute to reducing poverty, or, by contrast, if IMF critics are justified. In this
study we apply a quantitative approach to clear that question and evaluate the effects
of the IMF’s lending facilities on poverty rates and income distribution in participant
countries.
Although a big body of literature deals with analyzing the determinants of poverty and
income inequality, a unique theoretical framework is missing.2 This leads to the inclu-
sion of very heterogeneous sets of explanatory variables in different studies and empirical
findings that are hardly unanimous in supporting a particular argument. One reason
therefore might be the absence of universal causal mechanisms as there is no guarantee
that the economic processes and its interactions with poverty and inequality are the
same across countries or regions (Kenny & Williams, 2001). Due to data constraints
research in this field of developing economics, however, usually relies on cross-country
or large-n panel-data evidence. Time series analyses that would give scope for more
detailed structural investigations are seldom possible. Hence, the findings of empirical
work might be conditioned on the sample of countries (and the time period) covered by
the study. But also the set of explanatory variables included in the regressions could
drive the results.
Despite of the big number of regressors used in different studies it is common in the
empirical literature to regress a usually small number of variables on poverty or income
distribution, neglecting factors that have been proposed as determinants of poverty and
inequality by other authors. This motivates the concern for taking into account model
uncertainty, which is present in both the choice of explanatory variables and the result-
ing estimates connected to it, in order to unveil universally applicable relationships that
are not conditioned on a particular regressor set. As estimates obtained from selecting
one model do not take uncertainty into account, the precision of the resulting coefficients
is overestimated, thus, leading to a too confident interpretation of a variable as being
significant (Ferna´ndez et al. 2001).
To the knowledge of the author, Ghura et al. (2002) provide so far the only study that
explicitly controls for model uncertainty in finding robust determinants of poverty. The
work investigates the effect of 36 variables on average income in the lowest quintile of
the income distribution in a Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE, Sala-
i-Martin et al. 2004) analysis. Six out of the 36 variables are identified as robustly
related to poverty—gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth, inequality, infla-
tion, educational achievement, financial development, and government size—thus point-
1See Abugre 2000, Cavanagh et al. 2000, Hertz 2004, and Lundberg & Squire 2003, Vreeland 2002.
2For studies on the determinants of poverty see Adams (2004), Collier & Dollar (2002), Ghura et al.
(2002), Morduch (1994), Mosley et al. (2004), Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006), for inequality see Adams
(2004), Deininger & Squire (1998), Kuznets (1955), Meschi & Vivarelli (2009).
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ing towards the universal applicability of their effects. In this study we aim to identify
patterns concerning the impacts of program participation on poverty and inequality that
are common to a big group of countries. To provide a comprehensive picture we look at
six poverty indicators: The number of people living below the poverty line of 1.25$ or
2$ per day (headcount ratios), their income shortfall from these poverty lines (poverty
gaps), and income equality before and after redistribution (Gini indexes).3 As the focus
of this paper is to identify treatment effects, we take a slightly different approach to
Ghura et al. (2002). Instead of sampling over the whole model space (that is allowing
for every combination of explanatory variables) we restrict some of the variables to be
included in each regression. We estimate 90 model specifications for each poverty indi-
cator and perform model averaging over the results of the regressions. An explanation
of the procedure can be found in Section 3(b).
The contribution of this study is twofold. On the one hand we provide an empirical
study on a large group of countries (86 low- and middle income countries, from 1982 to
2009) taking both poverty and distributional aspects into account while controlling for
endogenous selection into IMF programs. On the other hand we explicitly account for
model uncertainty to work out to what extend this uncertainty puts the robustness of
the effect of program participation under strain. This kind of robustness analysis about
the consequences of IMF agreements for poverty and income inequality is the primary
concern of this research rather than identifying robust determinants of those indicators.
We find empirical evidence for adverse short-run effects of IMF agreements on the num-
ber of people living in poverty, as well as on the severity of poverty (measured by the
income shortfall from the poverty line). Income inequality (both, when measured before
and after redistribution) is found to rise with program participation—when estimating
the effects of concessional programs only, however, an improvement in inequality is de-
tected. Our results also indicate that the inclusion of poverty alleviation in the IMF’s
agenda turned out to be successful as restricting the estimations to the 2000-2009 period
the results are in many cases reversed.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of IMF programs,
their theoretical implications for poverty and inequality, as well as a short review of
the findings of more recent empirical studies. The estimation framework is outlined
in Section 3. It describes the methodologies of treatment effect regressions and model
averaging, followed by a summary of the model specifications. In Section 4 we report
data-based analyses and regression results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 IMF PROGRAMS
(a) Types of IMF programs
This study addresses both concessional as well as non-concessional programs of IMF
lending. Concessional loans carry zero interest payments (through the end of 2013)
and are available for low-income countries only while non-concessional loans are sub-
ject to the IMF’s market related interest rate, called the rate of charge4 (IMF 2012b).
3Kanbur (1987) and Sen (1979) provide information about the construction of poverty indicators and
a discussion of their adequacy for measuring poverty. Concerning data quality, it is widely recognized
that data on poverty and inequality suffer from measurement problems and comparability constraints.
Deaton (2001) provides a summary about potential problems underlying the measurement of poverty.
For an overview of caveats concerning inequality data see Atkinson & Brandolini (2001) and Solt (2009).
4The rate of charge is based on the SDR interest rate, which is revised weekly to take account for
changes in short-term interest rates in major international money markets.
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The non-concessional loans we consider are provided through Stand-By Arrangements
(SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). SBAs are short-term agreements, which
typically last from one to two years and imply higher conditionality than other types
of IMF lending programs. They are designed to help countries with severe disequilibria
to respond quickly to their external financing needs. The greatest amount of IMF re-
sources is provided under SBAs. The EFF was established to help countries with severe
disequilibria to address medium-term balance of payment problems which require fun-
damental economic reforms. The typical EFF program lasts for three years (IMF 2011c,
and IMF 2011d). The three concessional programs that form part of this study are
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), which was established in 1986, the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) founded in 1987, and the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF), which replaced the ESAF in 1999. The SAF and the ESAF
are longer-term programs with lower conditionality. Programs under the SAF normally
imply less stringent conditionality than ESAF programs and mostly antecede ESAF
programs. The PRGF is based on country-owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,
which are prepared by the government of the country concerned. The largest number of
IMF loans has been implemented through the PRGF in recent years (IMF 2011e, and
IMF 2011f).5 Although these program types differ in terms of duration, size, and loan
conditions, the underlying objectives are the same (Polak 1991, Przeworski & Vreeland
2000). Thus, in the main analysis of this article we follow conventional practice and
investigate the effects of participation in any of these programs.6
The above mentioned lending facilities are connected to conditionalities. Conditionalities
cover both policy requirements that a country has to fulfill in order that a tranche of
the loan gets disbursed, as well as tools used to monitor progress towards the goal
outlined in the program. These loan conditions are supposed to help to solve balance
of payments problems and ensure that the country will be able to repay the Fund (IMF
2011b). Typical conditionalities include policies concerning trade liberalization, fiscal
policy reforms and privatization, as well as financial reforms. These conditions affect
poverty either directly or as a channel for impacting on it. Although a detailed discussion
concerning all direct and indirect effects of these policies is beyond the scope of this
paper, we provide a short summary in the following.7
(b) Theoretical impacts of IMF programs on poverty and inequality
5As a reaction to the global financial crisis the IMF reshuffled the structure of lending facilities in
2009. The concessional lending facilities were rearranged and new non-concessional lending facilities
emerged. The new concessional facilities include the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which replaced
the (PRGF), the Standby Credit Facility (SCF), and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), both replacing
the Exogenous Shock Facility, which was established in 2008 (IMF 2011a, IMF 2011g). The Flexible
Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) emerged in 2009 and 2010 respectively as
new non-concessional lending facilities (IMF 2011h, and IMF 2011i). These recently created facilities,
however, are not the focus of this study as it addresses IMF programs up to the end of the year 2009.
In the rest of the paper we will use the terms programs and agreements for referring to IMF lending
programs.
6In order to find out if this simplification is justified we perform cluster analysis, taking into account
economic and financial indicators apart from poverty and inequality indicators. We fail to detect clus-
tering according to participation in different agreements, suggesting that focusing on aggregate program
participation is reasonable. Although most clusters include all program types, concessional programs
seem to be similarly distributed between clusters. The same is true for non-concessional programs.
Hence, we disaggregate program participation in concessional and non-concessional lending programs in
an additional robustness check. I thank one anonymous referee for pointing out the potential difference
in the effects of program types and Octavio Ferna´ndez-Amador for suggesting to perform cluster analysis.
7For a more detailed theoretical overview of the effects of conditionalities on poverty see also Cashin
et al. (2001). For an overview of the results of empirical studies see Hajro & Joyce (2009).
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Trade liberalization has two potential opposite effects on poverty. On the one hand,
sectors that were protected before the liberalization contract, leading to lower incomes
in these areas. On the other hand, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade
liberalization leads to increased demand and higher wages for unskilled workers in coun-
tries that are relatively abundant in unskilled labor (Handa & King 1997). Thus, the
theoretical effect of trade liberalization on poverty is ambiguous and depends on pro-
duction, trade, and consumption patterns (Gunter et al. 2005).8 Most of the work in
the recent empirical literature about the effects of trade liberalization on poverty shows
that trade liberalization has a positive impact on poverty reduction but leads to higher
inequality. Looking at the effects of trade on inequality in more detail there is evidence
that trade with high income countries worsens the income distribution of middle in-
come countries while it has no effect on the income distribution of low income countries
(Meschi & Vivarelli 2009).
A country under IMF agreement typically is obliged to decrease its budget deficit, which
can be achieved through an augmentation of fiscal revenue or a decrease in public ex-
penditure. The re-distributional effects of such reforms depend on the budgetary policy
that the government implements. Usually reductions in public expenditure imply cuts
in social spending, public sector wages, and public sector employment. The resulting
rise in unemployment and the lower wages in this sector tend to increase poverty levels
and worsen income distribution. Fiscal revenue can be increased with privatization of
state-owned enterprises (mostly implying layoffs of public sector employees) or reform
of the tax structure. Tax reform often implies a bigger focus on expenditure taxes and
a simplification of income taxes and, therefore, leads to a deterioration of the after-tax
income distribution.9 There is no consensus in the literature concerning whether partic-
ipation in IMF programs results in a decrease in social expenditure.10
Financial reforms include currency devaluation, liberalization of the financial sector, as
well as an adjustment of the banking sector. Although there is no clear-cut conclusion
about the relationship between devaluation and poverty (Gunter et al. 2005), devalua-
tion is connected to negative associations in developing countries (such as increased costs
of servicing foreign debt or capital flight of foreign investors). Theoretically, the effect
of currency devaluation is a decrease in the price ratio of non-tradable to tradable goods
which gives some scope for import substitution. Whether poor people benefit from a
devaluation depends on the composition of the economy and on consumption patterns.11
Financial liberalization is often connected to weaknesses in the domestic banking sector
and currency crises, leading to an increase in poverty. Therefore, such a liberalization
needs to be accompanied by sound economic policies and legal and regulatory under-
pinnings to improve economic performance (Bird & Rajan 2001). Bank reforms leading
to higher interest rates or more restrictive bank-reserves requirements, as well as the
introduction of credit ceilings, reduce the access to domestic credit and make it easier
for large companies to get credits in contrast to small and medium-sized firms. Also,
the urban sector is favored over the rural sector, resulting in rising inequality (Johnson
& Salop 1980, cited by Vreeland 2002). Most of these fiscal and financial reforms (credit
8Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006) provide a comprehensive overview of the channels through which
globalization might affect poverty.
9See Handa & King (1997), and Johnson & Salop (1980), cited by Vreeland (2002).
10See Handa & King (1997) and Nooruddin & Simmons (2006) for evidence that participation in IMF
programs leads to a decrease in social expenditure, and Martin & Segura-Ubiergo (2004) for evidence
against it.
11See Bourguignon et al. (1992), Garuda (2000), Kanbur (1987), and Pastor (1987) for more details
about the effects of financial reforms on poverty.
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restraints, budgetary cuts, higher levels of taxation, and reductions in real wages) are
very likely to reduce domestic demand. The resulting contraction of spending is most
probable to decrease the welfare of people whose main source of income is labor income
and people living in poverty (Heller 1988).
The policies implemented under IMF agreements are supposed to lead to a reduction
of inflation and restore economic growth. Economists broadly agree that high levels of
inflation have negative consequences on economic growth and poverty. Some studies,
however, find that countries that maintain macroeconomic stability do not necessarily
gain significant improvements in economic growth and poverty reduction.12 Theoreti-
cally the effect of inflation on income distribution depends on how rigidly income adjusts
to prices for each group of the population. If poorer individuals face longer adjustment
lags than wealthier ones, a higher inflation rate will raise income inequality (Garuda,
2000). While it is not clear whether growth affects inequality in one way or the other,
most authors agree that economic growth is fundamental for poverty reduction. Some
point out that the sectoral composition of growth and its distributional effects matter for
poverty alleviation. This highlights the need for appropriate politico-economic programs
that create conditions for the poor to benefit from growth.13 The empirical evidence
on whether participation in IMF programs leads to a higher rate of economic growth
is ambiguous. Some studies find that IMF lending reduces economic growth, whereas
others find beneficial effects of IMF support on growth.14
The possibilities for implementing IMF programs are broad and imply different conse-
quences for poverty and income distribution. Political power plays an important role in
determining the design of the program and to which extent conditionalities are fulfilled.
It is likely that IMF programs are carried out in a way that does not hurt politically
powerful groups, frequently at the expense of the poor. Furthermore, participation in
a program makes it easier for policymakers to tackle painful reforms as they can blame
the Fund for “forcing” them to do so.15
(c) Empirical findings
Investigating the impacts of IMF agreements on the distribution of income most studies
find that program participation is connected to higher inequality. More recent large-n
studies that control for sample selection as opposed to many earlier investigations in this
12Easterly & Fischer (2001), Ghura et al. (2002), and Meschi & Vivarelli (2009) agree on the negative
consequences of high levels of inflation, while Gunter et al. (2005) find no significant improvement in
economic growth and poverty reduction in periods of macroeconomic stability.
13Information about the effects of economic growth on inequality is provided by Deininger & Squire
(1998), Dollar & Kraay (2004), Ghura et al. (2002), and Ravallion & Chen (1997). While Adams (2004),
Dollar & Kraay (2002), Fanta & Upadhyay (2008), and Ghura et al. (2002) provide general evidence for
the effect of growth on poverty, Cashin et al. (2001), Garuda (2000), Hajro & Joyce (2009), Loayza &
Raddatz (2010), and Stiglitz (2002) point out that certain conditions have to be met in order for poor
people to benefit from economic growth.
14Atoyan & Conway (2006) point out the ambiguity of the effect of IMF lending on economic growth.
For evidence that IMF lending reduces growth see Barro & Lee (2005), Bordo & Schwartz (2000), and
Przeworski & Vreeland (2000), for evidence of the beneficial effects of IMF programs for growth see
Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000), Evrensel (2002), and Hutchison (2004). Ul Haque & Kahn (1998) and
Steinwand & Stone (2008) provide a more detailed summary about the effects of participation in IMF
programs on macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, inflation, balance of payments, and
current account deficits.
15Arpac et al. (2008), Garuda (2000), Pastor (1987), and Vreeland (2002) recognize that political power
plays a role both for program design and compliance with conditionalities. Collier & Dollar (2002), Dreher
& Walter (2010) state that the IMF exerts a scapegoat function for implementing unpopular reforms.
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field include the work of Garuda (2000) and Vreeland (2002). While Garuda’s study sug-
gests that IMF programs lead to a deterioration of the income distribution in countries
with severe external imbalances but to a relative improvement in distributional indica-
tors if imbalances are small, Vreeland concludes that program participation lowers the
labor share of income in the manufacturing sector thus contributing to rising inequality.
In contrast to Garuda’s study that relies on propensity score group comparisons covering
39 countries over the 1975-1991 period, Vreeland’s work is based on a dynamic version
of Heckman’s (1979) selection model for 110 countries over the 1961-1993 period. More
recent studies that investigate the effects of program participation on poverty find that,
both, IMF and World Bank programs lower the response of poverty levels to changes
in economic growth (Easterly 2001). However, neither infant mortality nor the Human
Development Index, as proxies for poverty, are found to be significantly different in
countries that participate in an IMF agreement (Hajro & Joyce 2009). While the results
of Easterly’s work are based on instrumental variable regressions for 65 countries, the
study of Hajro & Joyce does not explicitly control for self-selection but performs fixed
effects regressions for a sample of 82 countries.16
3 ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
In the empirical analysis we are confronted with several kinds of statistical challenges.
First, there is a problem of unobservability of the counterfactual outcome. We can
perceive what happens to countries that took part in an IMF agreement after program
participation, but we cannot observe what would have happened to them otherwise. Sec-
ond, we are confronted with an endogeneity problem as the choice of a country whether
to participate in a program is not made randomly. Countries which are more likely to
join an IMF agreement generally face specific macroeconomic conditions that make them
eligible for participation in programs (Przeworski & Vreeland 2000). These differences,
which could themselves influence poverty and/or income distribution, have to be con-
trolled for, otherwise leading to biased estimates of the effect of program participation.
Finally, we also face a problem of model uncertainty as it is not clear which factors are
robust determinants of program participation and poverty indicators.
In order to address the first two issues and obtain unbiased estimates, we deal with
program evaluation as a particular case of a treatment effects setup. Although it is
impossible to observe the counterfactual outcome, the task is to match countries that
participate in an IMF program with countries that face similar conditions but do not
form part such a program. While some of these conditions are observable some, like po-
litical will, might be not. Treatment effect regressions remove the effects of non-random
selection taking into account both observable and unobservable factors. The remaining
difference in poverty or inequality between countries that form part of IMF agreements
and countries that do not is the inherent effect of IMF programs (Vreeland 2002, 2003).
In order to address model uncertainty, we estimate various treatment effect regressions
with country fixed effects based on different sets of explanatory variables that could po-
tentially be driving factors of program participation and poverty measures. We test for
the presence of selection bias in each of the model specifications. If there is no evidence
for such bias, we estimate OLS regressions with country fixed effects additionally to the
treatment effect regressions. Based on the results we perform model averaging, placing
more importance on models with higher explanatory power. For constructing the model
16For a summary of earlier research dealing with the effect of IMF programs on poverty and inequality
see Hajro & Joyce (2009).
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weights, we use both Bayesian (Schwarz 1978) and frequentist (Akaike 1973) information
criteria. Subsequently, we get an insight about which factors affect the poverty indica-
tors used, independent of model specification and free of selection bias, and are able to
evaluate the robustness of program effects.
(a) Treatment effects model
We are interested in estimating
yit = x
′
it−1β + δDit−τ + ξi + it (1)
where yit is alternatively one of the six poverty indicators used in this study—the natu-
ral logarithm of poverty gaps and poverty headcount ratios both at the poverty line of
1.25$ and 2$ per day, and Gini indexes of gross and net income inequality—measured in
period t for country i, xit−1 is a vector of variables that likely affect poverty or income
inequality, and β is the corresponding parameter vector. Dit−τ is a dummy variable
which is equal to one if country i is participating in an IMF program at time t− τ and
zero otherwise.17 Its coefficient δ reports the effect of program participation on poverty
and income distribution. ξi is the time invariant country fixed effect of country i and
it is the random error term. As we cannot test for reverse causation due to data lim-
itations, all of the explanatory variables enter with one year time lag in order to avoid
contemporaneous feedback effects.18
Estimation results relying on specification (1) are potentially subject to bias due to en-
dogenous selection into program participation, as countries do not make their choice
whether to ask the IMF for help randomly but depending on their macroeconomic con-
ditions and other (unobservable) factors. Therefore, it is not possible to tell if the effect
on poverty or income inequality arises due to program participation or those differences,
unless controlling for non-random selection.19 To take this into account we make use of
treatment effect models, which allow to estimate the impact of program participation
on poverty and income distribution consistently. Treatment effect models rely on an
instrumental variable approach in which the endogenous program participation Dit is
instrumented as
D∗it = w
′
it−1γ + z
′
it−1α+ uit, (2)
and depends on a set of variables wit−1 which explain program participation, and at least
one exclusion restriction zit−1, which should be correlated with Dit but uncorrelated with
yit in (1). The validity of the exclusion restriction is essential for effective bias correction.
γ and α are the coefficient vectors for these two sets of variables, and D∗it is a latent
variable with its observable counterpart Dit that is generated by
Dit =
{
1 if D∗it > 0
0 otherwise
The system formed by (1) and (2) assumes bivariate normal distributed error terms uit
and it and homoscedasticity, with V ar(it) = σ
2, V ar(uit) = 1, and Cov(it, uit) = ρσ,
17In the empirical section of the paper τ ranges from 0 to 2.
18The same data limitations make us dependent on using cross country information for investigating
the effects of IMF programs although the possibility exists that causal mechanisms differ across countries.
By allowing for country fixed effects we take into account differences in levels of poverty and inequality.
19See Conway (1994), Dreher & Walter (2010), Goldstein & Montiel (1986), Przeworski & Vreeland
(2000), and Vreeland (2002).
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and can either be estimated in two stages or jointly by maximum likelihood. Although
computationally less expensive, the two stage estimator is inefficient compared to max-
imum likelihood. Therefore, the latter approach is used in this paper (Heckman 1974,
Nelson 1984). As the treatment effects model accounts for endogeneity, δ is free of bias
and can be interpreted as the effect of program participation on poverty or income dis-
tribution, respectively.20
With this theoretical framework in mind, the researcher has to specify potential determi-
nants, x, of the poverty measures in equation (1)—what we will refer to as the outcome
equation—and the variables included in w and z that explain program participation in
equation (2)—what we will call the selection equation. The empirical literature on the
determinants of participation in IMF programs proposes quite a lot of different sets of
explanatory variables driving such a decision.21 To the knowledge of the author, Sturm
et al. (2005) provide the first attempt to address model uncertainty including a very
broad set of explanatory variables which potentially influence the probability of obtain-
ing an IMF credit. Moser & Sturm (2011) update the work of Sturm et al. (2005) for the
post-Cold War period. Both studies make use of the Extreme Bounds Analysis proposed
by Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine & Renelt (1992) to identify robust determinants of
IMF programs and analyze the entire distribution of the coefficient estimates as pro-
posed by Sala-i-Martin (1997). While Sturm et al. (2005) find that mostly economic
variables play a role in IMF lending decisions, Moser & Sturm (2011) suggest that also
political variables matter.
Addressing model uncertainty in the selection equation (2) as outlined here, as well as in
the outcome equation (1) as sketched out in Section 1, we estimate a broad range of alter-
native models including different sets of regressors and instruments. Then, we perform
averaging of the coefficients obtained from those model specifications using Bayesian and
frequentist information for constructing model weights. The primary aim of applying
this method is to ensure that a significant coefficient of the program dummy is not the
result of model selection, but is robust to model specification.
(b) Model averaging
The importance of sensitivity analyses for empirical studies has already been emphasized
by Leamer (1983, 1985) who proposes a method for testing the robustness of variables,
which he calls Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA). EBA consists of running a battery of
regressions including variables that are common to each specification (free variables),
and additional explanatory variables (doubtful variables) that enter in any linear com-
bination in the model. In order to classify a variable as robust, the minimum and the
maximum of its coefficient have to be statistically significant and of the same sign. The
EBA has been regarded to impose too strong conditions on the variable coefficients in
order to be considered as robust, however, and new methods for dealing with model
uncertainty have developed (Ferna´ndez et al. 2001, Sala-i-Martin 1997, Sala-i-Martin et
al. 2004).
20For further details on treatment effect models consult Cameron & Trivedi (2009, pp. 869-871),
Greene (2008, pp. 889-890), Heckman (1978), or Maddala (2008, pp. 117-125).
21Studies that deal with the participation decision in IMF programs include Andersen et al. (2006),
Atoyan & Conway (2006), Barro & Lee (2005), Bird & Rowlands (2001), Broz & Hawes (2006), Dreher et
al. (2009), Dreher & Walter (2010), Dreher & Sturm (2012), Eichengreen et al. (2008), Elekdag (2008),
Garuda (2000), Harrigan et al. (2006), Moser & Sturm (2011), Przeworski & Vreeland (2000), Sturm et
al. (2005), and Vreeland (2002).
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This paper builds on the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) proposed
by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), which relies on averaging ordinary least squares (OLS)
coefficients across models with model weights being proportional to the Bayesian In-
formation Criterion, BIC (Schwarz, 1978). Applying model averaging in the context of
program evaluation, the method we use differs from BACE in the way that we do not
apply a sampling algorithm. Rather, we specify what Leamer (1985) calls free variables
and sequentially include other variables which are believed to have an influence on the
dependent variable. The resulting models form part of the averaging process. We prefer
this approach to a full BACE approach because of two main aspects. In terms of variable
selection we allow, on the one hand, only for model specifications which are theoretically
reasonable, on the other hand, we can explicitly take care of the handling of exclusion
restrictions, which we introduced in Section 3(a). Also, in terms of efficiency, sampling
over the whole model space would entail a huge computational expense, as Maximum
Likelihood estimations of treatment effect models are rather time consuming.
We follow Buckland et al. (1997) in using model weights which are obtained from
information criteria like the Akaike Information Criterion, AIC (Akaike, 1973), and the
BIC.22 The weight for model k is calculated as
wk =
exp(−Ik/2)∑K
j=1 exp(−Ij/2)
(3)
where I is the information criterion and K is the number of model specifications. Fol-
lowing Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) we derive the model averaged coefficients, βˆ, and their
variance, V ar(βˆ), as
βˆ =
K∑
j=1
wj βˆj (4)
V ar(βˆ) =
K∑
j=1
wjV ar(βˆj) +
K∑
j=1
wj(βˆj − βˆ)2, (5)
where βˆj and V ar(βˆj) are the coefficient and variance estimates from the treatment
effect regression with the regressor set that defines model j.
(c) Model specifications
The results of this paper rely on averaging over 18 specifications of the outcome equa-
tion (1), which are combined with five different specifications of the selection equation
(2). This leads to 90 treatment effect models being averaged for each poverty indicator.
Table 1 shows the five specifications of the selection equation. The variables Vote in
line with G7t−1, Countries under programt, and Past program yearst serve as exclusion
22Raftery (1995) provides a formal derivation of the BIC approximation to the Bayes factor, the latter
being used to construct model weights in a fully Bayesian context. Clyde (2000) gives a justification for
model weights based on both the BIC and the AIC. The BIC is biased in favor of parsimony over fit
while the AIC often tends to overestimate the number of parameters needed (Clyde 2000, Raftery 1995).
Therefore, we perform model averaging with model weights based on either one of the two. The results
based on the AIC, which are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained by the use of the BIC, are not
reported here but are available from the author upon request.
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restrictions, z.23 Appendix B discusses the model specifications in more detail and pro-
vides an overview of studies using the explanatory variables that are also included in
the here presented work. Since the primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the
effects of IMF programs on poverty and inequality, I refer to the studies mentioned in
the appendix for a discussion of the effect of the explanatory variables.24
Insert Table 1 here.
Table 2 reports the 18 specifications of the outcome equation. A base of variables is
included in each estimation which, additionally to variables proposed in the literature
like the logarithm of GDP per capita, a democracy index, and the Gini coefficient, also
includes country dummies and three time trends to control for common developments
before participation in a program, during program participation and after the termina-
tion of an agreement. The reason for the three exclusion restrictions to be included in
all specifications is to allow the assessment of their validity.25 We request at least one
exclusion restriction to be valid in order to use the estimation results for inference about
program effects. The country dummies are included in order to control for individual
effects that are time invariant. As shown in Table 2 each of the model specifications
adds different variables to the common base.26
Insert Table 2 here.
Estimating the 90 treatment effect models for each of the six poverty indicators allows us
to test for statistically significant error correlation between the residuals of the selection
equation and the ones from the outcome equation, ρσ (see Section 3(a)). A statistically
insignificant error correlation suggests that there is no bias arising from endogenous
selection of countries into a program and the equation could be estimated by OLS.
For these cases (where ρ turns out to be statistically insignificant) we also estimate
OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We include the same variables that form
part of the selection and the outcome equation in the OLS regressions, leading to a
maximum number of 90 model specifications also here. In order to gain insight on
whether program participation affects poverty and income distribution upon impact, we
include the instrumented program participation dummy in the same year, t, in which the
poverty outcome is observed. Additionally, we estimate specifications in which program
participation is included with one (τ = 1), or two (τ = 2), time lags respectively. The
results are shown in Section 4.
23Voting behavior in the UN General Assembly serves as a proxy for a country’s political proximity to
the G7 countries who have some degree of influence over IMF decisions. Voting in line with G7 countries
is found to be connected to a higher probability of obtaining a loan and better terms from the IMF. The
number of countries under agreement in a certain year can be seen as a proxy for world conditions—as
world conditions are bad, more countries turn to the Fund. Alternatively, the more countries turn to the
Fund, the less costly the sovereignty costs may be perceived to be, so more countries apply for a program
(Sturm et al. 2005). The number of years a country spent under IMF agreement is included because
countries that participated already in IMF programs are more likely to do so again. This happens as the
political cost may be lower if a country has already participated in an IMF program before, as compared
to the first agreement with the Fund (Vreeland 2003).
24See Steinwand & Stone (2008) for a more complete survey about factors determining participation
in IMF programs.
25Like already mentioned in Section 3(a), exclusion restrictions should be significant in explaining
the country’s participation decision in IMF programs but should not be correlated with the dependent
variable of the outcome equation.
26We drop individuals with less than two data points available. Note that the estimation of all model
specifications is based on same number of observations (Akaike 1973, Schwarz 1978).
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4 DESCRIPTIVES, RESULTS, AND ROBUSTNESS
(a) Data and descriptive statistics
For investigating the effects of IMF programs empirically, we combine various databases
to construct an (unbalanced) panel dataset covering the period 1982-2009 and including
86 low- and middle income countries. Details about variables, data sources, and descrip-
tive statistics concerning the variables used, as well as a list of countries included in this
study, can be found in Appendix A.
To provide a first, descriptive overview of the six poverty indicators that are the fo-
cus of this study, we form five classes according to the program participation status of
countries. This leads to groups of countries which were never under IMF agreement
in the time period from 1982 to 2009, before the first program participation, currently
participating in a program, between two IMF programs and after the last IMF program
that has been implemented in the country as long as data are reported. Summary
statistics—number of observations, means, medians, standard deviations, minima, and
maxima—for poverty gaps and headcount ratios can be found in Table 3. The distribu-
tion of all four indicators is positively skewed. Thus, focusing on the median values of the
indicators, poverty is the lowest for countries of our sample which never participated in
an IMF program, and the highest for countries before their first participation and during
the agreement. After the last program participation poverty turns out to be lower again.
Insert Table 3 here.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for Gini indexes of gross and net income inequality—
the former measuring income inequality before taxes and transfers, the latter income
inequality after redistribution. Both indexes are the highest for countries that never
adopted an IMF program, indicating higher income inequality in those countries. They
are the lowest after the last program participation.
Insert Table 4 here.
(b) Empirical specification
For illustrative purposes, coming to the specifications of the treatment effects models,
Table 5 shows the results of probit estimations of the selection equations. It reports
marginal effects at means of the variables. In our sample most of the regressors turn out
to be significant predictors of participation in an IMF programs with their coefficients
showing the expected sign. The natural logarithm of GDP per capita is found to have a
significant non-linear relationship with IMF program participation.27 The probability of
receiving an IMF program initially increases with GDP per capita but later decreases.
The estimated coefficients imply that the switch occurs at a GDP per capita between
$983.5 (column 1) and $1187 (column 2)28, which lies below the sample mean and the
sample median of the datasets used. The natural logarithm of GDP and its square, as
27Ln(GDP pc) and its square are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.000 for each of the five speci-
fications. The same is true for ln(GDP) and its square, where the p-values for the joint significance lie
between 0.0157 (specification 2) and 0.0261 (specification 5), respectively. When dropping the squared
terms from the specifications, the coefficients of ln(GDP pc) and ln(GDP) turn out to be negative and
significant, each. The results that are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 are robust to this specification
change.
28That corresponds to a ln(GDP pc) between 6.891 and 7.079.
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well as the current account balance, turn out to be insignificant in predicting program
participation. Voting behavior in the UN General Assembly and trade are only weak
determinants of the adoption of an IMF agreement for the countries in our dataset.
A possible reason for the insignificant or significantly negative trade coefficient in our
sample is the lack of controlling for the composition of trade, for which unfortunately
there are not data available.
Insert Table 5 here.
We do not show the estimation results of each of the treatment effects models as this
would go beyond the scope of this paper due to space limitations. Rather we provide
the results of the averaging across all models in the next subsection.
(c) Averaging results and robustness
Table 6 reports the results of the averaging over the model specifications described ear-
lier, for poverty gaps and headcount ratios as dependent variables. Because of space
constraints we report only the results that are based on the BIC for constructing model
weights.29 Which poverty indicator has been used as the dependent variable is visible
in the head of the table. The table provides information about the contemporaneous
program effect on the poverty indicator (seen in the panel labeled τ = 0), as well as
program effects of one (τ = 1), or two years time lag (τ = 2). For which time lag the
results are reported can be seen in the first column. The second column indicates, for
each time lag, how many and which exclusion restrictions have been satisfied in order
to include a model in the averaging process. Also the results of the averaging over OLS
fixed effects regressions are reported. Finally, the outcome of the averaging process can
be found in the cells of the last four columns. Each cell reports the mean of the posterior
distribution of the program participation coefficient with the significance level attached
to it, as well as the posterior standard error (in parentheses) below. The number of
model specifications included in the averaging process is reported at the bottom of each
cell. In the case of treatment effects, it is the number of models (out of the 90 models
estimated) which fulfill the respective exclusion restriction. In the case of fixed effects,
it is the number of models for which no endogeneity bias was detected. The percent-
age in parentheses next to it indicates its fraction of the overall 90 model specifications.30
Insert Table 6 here.
Table 6 reveals a clear-cut impact of program participation on poverty gaps and head-
count ratios, measured at the poverty lines of 1.25$ and 2$ per day for our sample.
As already mentioned, the results shown in the table rely on averaging the coefficients
over different treatment effect regressions with country fixed effects (the values in the
rows labeled OLS fixed effects are an exception).31 According to the treatment effect
results, program participation increases both, the number of people living in poverty
(poverty headcount ratios), as well as their income shortfall from the respective poverty
29The results do not change quantitatively if we use the AIC instead of the BIC.
30The high values of the percentages (for one fulfilled exclusion restriction) indicate that the reported
outcome relies on a big number of averaged models and is not the result of only a few model specifications.
31Like pointed out in Section 3(a), treatment effect regressions control for differences in economic
conditions in countries prior to their participation in an IMF program and selection bias arising from
it. As OLS regressions are just computed for model specifications for which treatment effect regressions
show an insignificant error correlation of the residuals, ρσ, the results relying on OLS fixed effects should
not be influenced by selection bias to a big extent.
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line (poverty gaps). All poverty indicators worsen in the year the program is in force
(τ = 0), as well as in the following year (τ = 1). Two years after program participa-
tion has been observed, the undesirable effect of participation in an agreement on most
poverty measures vanishes (τ = 2). Generally, the poverty augmenting effect of program
participation is stronger when poverty is measured at the lower poverty line of 1.25$ per
day, meaning that the poorest members of the economy are hit the most by unfavorable
program effects. Quantifying the effects, according to our data program participation
has the biggest contemporaneous impact on the income shortfall of poor people from the
1.25$ poverty line followed by the number of people living with an income below this line.
The effects of IMF programs on the two poverty indicators measured at the 2$ poverty
line, are somewhat smaller.32 The magnitudes of the program effects on poverty should
be taken with care, however, as the measurement of poverty is not without problems
(Deaton 2001). For most indicators the detrimental effect on poverty diminishes as we
include more time lags between program participation and the poverty index, until the
program effect becomes insignificant.33 Turning to the OLS fixed effects regressions the
averaging leads to statistically insignificant effects of program participation in almost all
cases. The only exception is the favorable slightly significant effect of program partici-
pation on the number of people living in poverty (measured at the lower poverty line of
1.25$ per day).34 35
Due to space constraints, we do not show the averaged coefficients of the other variables
forming part of the regressions but summarize the results shortly.36 In line with theory
and previous studies, higher GDP per capita, as well as a higher level of democracy, and
a more equal distribution of income are found to significantly lower poverty as measured
by our four poverty indicators.37 The time trends indicate that poverty increases in the
time the program is in force.38 In some cases, the number of countries that are partic-
ipating in an IMF program in a certain year, which could serve as a proxy for world
conditions (Vreeland 2002), turns out to be significantly correlated to higher poverty,
measured at the 2$ per day poverty line. Including the natural logarithm of GDP per
32The results suggest that the income shortfall from the 1.25$ poverty line more than doubles due to
program participation, the shortfall from the 2$ line rises by up to 44%. The number of people living
below the 1.25$ line increases by about 68%, or up to 39% considering the higher poverty line. Recall that
for obtaining these numbers the program coefficient has to be transformed as %∆y = [exp(δ)− 1]× 100.
33One exception is the income shortfall of people from the poverty line of 2$ per day, which is found to
be stronger affected as we increase the time between program participation and its impact on poverty.
The effect of program participation (included with two years time lag) on this indicator remains signifi-
cant only when the averaging is based on a small number of specifications (2% of total).
34This finding should be treated with caution, however, as it relies on a relatively small number of
model specifications (3% of total) for which sample selection bias has not been detected. In the other
97% of model specifications for this indicator, sample selection bias has been found to be present. For
contemporaneous effects of program participation selection bias has been detected in each specification,
therefore no OLS fixed effects results are reported.
35Running separate regressions for three income-group subsamples we confirm the poverty increasing
effect of IMF agreements for low-income and lower-middle income countries. In upper-middle income
countries we fail to detect statistically significant results although the program coefficients have a positive
sign. The insignificance of the program effects in upper-middle-income countries might stem from the
lower number of observations in each subgroup. I thank one anonymous referee for suggesting to include
this analysis in the paper.
36In the following we denote a variable as having an effect on poverty if it is statistically significant at
least at the 10% level.
37These results are in line with Adams (2004), Fanta & Upadhyay (2008), Ghura et al. (2002), Mosley
et al. (2004), and Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006). As opposed to our findings Ghura et al. (2002) did not
find democratic institutions being a robust determinant of the income share of the lowest quintile.
38There is slight evidence that the number of people living with less than two dollars per day has been
increasing before program participation and has been decreasing afterwards. This, however, cannot be
confirmed for other poverty indicators.
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capita squared, we find an interesting pattern. Its coefficient is found to be positive
and significant in explaining 1.25$ line poverty indicators (the coefficient of ln GDP per
capita becomes more negative), while it is negative and significant in explaining the
2$ line poverty indicators (the coefficient of ln GDP per capita becomes insignificant
or positive). This result suggests that as the level of per capita income increases, its
marginal impact on poverty at the 1.25$ line decreases, while the poverty reducing effect
for poverty measured at the 2$ line becomes stronger. Other factors that are found to
be significantly lowering poverty include domestic credit to the private sector (as sug-
gested by Morduch 1994), which mostly affects poverty measured at the poverty line of
2$ per day, and currency devaluation (Gunter et al. 2005, and Kanbur 1987). A hyper
devaluation, however, (measured as a devaluation of more than 200% within one year)
is found to lead to an increase in poverty. There is also some, but limited, evidence
that a higher average in years of schooling, higher life expectancy, and urbanization
are significantly correlated to lower poverty rates, while hyperinflation leads to a rise in
poverty.39 The data suggest that the general development over time has been a decrease
in poverty.40 Variables whose effect on poverty remains unclear are trade openness and
population growth. Their coefficients are insignificant in most cases and, if significant,
the direction depends on the specification of the estimation. Investment, government
consumption, GDP per capita growth, a country’s natural resource rents, and the value
added in agriculture are not found to be significant determinants of poverty.41
Providing further details, Appendix C gives an overview of the treatment effect mod-
els that enter with the highest weights in the averaging process. For each poverty and
income inequality indicator it reports the estimation results of the tree “best” model
specifications, where program participation enters without time lag in the model.42
Insert Table 7 here.
Table 7 is built up in a similar way to Table 6 and shows how IMF programs affect
income inequality in our sample. The results based on treatment effect regressions indi-
cate that program participation is connected to higher income inequality measured both
before redistribution (Gini gross), and afterwards (Gini net).43 While program partici-
pation seems to have a stronger contemporaneous effect on income inequality after taxes
and transfers, the reverse is true if the program dummy enters the estimations with one
year time lag. The increase in the Gini indexes as a result of program participation lies
between 2.5 and 3.5 points. The same caution as before in interpreting magnitudes also
applies here. Including program participation with two years time lag, the significant
39The findings concerning education and life expectancy are in line with Easterly & Fischer (2001),
Fanta & Upadhyay (2008), Ghura et al. (2002), and Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006). Theoretically
however, higher urbanization is suggested to lead to an increase in inequality, and therefore also results
in higher poverty (see Kuznets 1955, and Nissanke & Thorbecke 2006), what cannot be confirmed by
this study.
40This finding is in line with Mosley et al. (2004) and Ravallion & Chen (1997).
41Ghura et al. (2002) identify GDP per capita growth as a robust determinant of poverty, what is
opposed to our result.
42The results for the inclusion of program participation with one or two years time lag can be obtained
from the author upon request.
43The results here rely on a smaller number of model specifications because for many specifications
none of the three exclusion restrictions is fulfilled. Especially, when the time lag with which program
participation is included in the regressions is increased, less exclusion restrictions satisfy the requirement
of being significant in the selection equation but insignificant in the outcome equation. Estimating the ef-
fect of two years lagged program participation on the income distribution measured before redistribution,
none of the exclusion restriction is valid for any of the model specifications.
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effect of IMF programs disappears. Averaging over OLS fixed effects estimations reveals
a statistically insignificant effect of IMF programs on income inequality. Our results
support the findings of Vreeland (2002) who finds a deterioration of income equality due
to a decline in the labor share of income resulting from the adoption of IMF programs.44
Concerning the effect of other variables we find evidence for an equalizing effect of
higher levels of democracy and a bigger amount of years a country has spent under IMF
program, while countries with higher per capita GDP and countries that vote in line
with the G7 are connected to a higher degree of inequality. According to these results a
higher average income leads to both, a reduction in poverty, and a deterioration in income
inequality. Hence, an increase in GDP per capita does not translate into a proportional
rise in the income of the poor, as opposed to what is sometimes assumed in the literature
(Collier & Dollar 2002). We find that inequality before taxes and redistribution is
rising in program years, while both indicators are worsening after program participation.
There is some limited evidence that before program participation inequality has been
decreasing. For our sample we can confirm Kuznets’ (1955) hypothesis that inequality
is increasing with income, but as a certain income per capita is attained the income
distribution becomes more egalitarian. Furthermore, the data reveal strong evidence
that higher levels of investment and domestic credit to the private sector as well as
higher life expectancy are correlated with higher inequality. As those indicators, among
others, can be seen as reflecting the development status of a country, the income gap is
found to widen as countries become more developed. Thus, in the context of Kuznets’s
(1955) hypothesis, the countries in our sample did not yet reach the state of development
beyond which the income distribution becomes more equal. Notwithstanding, ceteris
paribus, the general development in our sample is a decrease in inequality over time.
Apart from that, we find that higher openness to trade is associated with a greater
degree of inequality,45 in contrast to currency depreciation and deflation, which are
connected to a more equal income distribution.46 Finally, there is some limited evidence
that higher rates of population growth and government consumption are connected to
higher inequality (Ghura et al. 2002, Kuznets 1955), while a bigger value added in
the agricultural sector, higher growth of GDP per capita, and a higher average level of
education lead to a decline in inequality.47
(d) Have things changed after 2000?
One can argue that with the introduction of the PRGF in 1999 and the adoption of
poverty alleviation in the IMF’s agenda bigger focus has been paid to the reduction of
poverty and inequality. Therefore, we estimate the same equations for the 2000-2009
period. Table 8 summarizes the results for this subsample.48
Insert Table 8 here.
44Running separate regressions for three income-group subsamples we fail to detect significant results
in most cases. A surprising finding is the statistically significant gross inequality decreasing effect of
IMF programs in lower-middle income countries. The result is, however, based on one single model
specification only.
45In comparison to Meschi & Vivarelli (2009) we lack data to control for the origin of imports and
the destination of exports to take into account the development status of the trading partner. Meschi &
Vivarelli (2009) find that trade with industrialized countries worsens the income distribution of middle
income countries, while trade with other developing countries leads to an improvement.
46Meschi & Vivarelli (2009) find a deterioration in income equality due to high levels of inflation.
47These results are in line with Kuznets (1955), Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006), and Ravallion & Chen
(1997).
48For space reasons Table 8 only reports the results of treatment effect regressions relying on at least
one fulfilled exclusion restriction and OLS regressions.
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The effects of IMF programs from year 2000 onwards are found to be different from the
results of the unrestricted sample, providing evidence for the IMF’s success in taking
into account poverty issues. The contemporaneous effect of program participation is
now a decrease in poverty rates. However, this effect seems to disappear as the time
lag with which program participation enters the estimation increases. For some poverty
indicators program participation even leads to higher poverty rates when the program
dummy is entered with one or two years time lag. Fixed effects regressions result in sta-
tistically insignificant impacts of IMF programs on poverty. Concerning inequality, the
results indicate that in the 2000-2009 period program participation leads to a decrease
in (gross and net) income inequality, independent of the time lag with which program
participation enters the estimations.49
But is it really the introduction of the PRGF that drives the results? Figure 1 shows the
frequency of participation in different IMF programs for different time periods. It can
be seen that after the beginning of the year 2000 the importance of SBA, and programs
under the EFF and SAF decreased, while the amount of programs under the ESAF and
the PRGF increased after 2000. Although it is possible that the results for the post-2000
period are driven by the increased amount of ESAF/PRGF programs, a clear confirma-
tion therefore is not provided by this analysis.
Insert Figure 1 here.
In order to shed light on the question if the poverty decreasing effect is due to the higher
frequency of lending programs under the ESAF/PRGF, we disaggregate the program
dummy to concessional and non-concessional lending agreements.50 The results can be
found in Table 9.
Insert Table 9 here.
As Table 9 shows, the poverty decreasing effect of IMF programs after the year 2000
does not seem to be due to the higher number of ESAF/PRGF participations. Conces-
sional lending agreements turn out to be generally connected to rising poverty rates.51
In contrast, the same programs are found to lead to an improvement in the income distri-
bution, both before and after taxes and transfers, although the effect turns insignificant
49The results of the averaging over OLS fixed effects regressions for 2 year lagged program participation
contradict the results of the treatment effect regressions when looking at the net income inequality
indicator. Controlling for selection bias can lead to different results than not taking this source of bias
into account, even if selection bias is not detected statistically. I thank two anonymous referees for
suggesting to include the analysis of the post-2000 sub period in the paper.
50According to the cluster analysis results we cannot detect different clusters based on SAF and
ESAF/PRGF participation but find that those programs are similarly distributed across clusters. The
same applies to SBAs and EFF programs. Therefore, program participation is not disaggregated even
further to the individual program level. When estimating the effects of each individual program type
separately—in a two-stage treatment effects framework due to the lower variability in the program
dummies—all program types are found to be connected to a rise in poverty rates. SBAs and SAF
programs are found to lead to rising income inequality, while ESAF/PRGF and EFF programs seem to
be connected to lower inequality. The findings concerning EFF and SAF programs rely on a relatively
small number of program observations and a relatively small number of models that enter in the model
averaging. I thank one anonymous referee for suggesting to include this explorative analysis in the paper.
51The only exception is the fall in headcount ratios at the 2$ line when the concessional program
dummy is included with one year time lag. This outcome relies, however, on only two model specifications
that enter in the averaging.
17
when program participation is included with two years time lag.52
Although confirmed for a large group of developing countries in our sample, we would
like to remind the reader that our results should not be interpreted as being universally
applicable. A more detailed causal analysis that does not merely rely on cross-country
comparisons would be needed, especially if predictions are the sphere of interest. This
kind of analysis has, however, been impeded so far due to data limitations and it remains
to hope it will be made possible in the future.
5 CONCLUSION
We investigated how IMF lending programs affect six indicators measuring three dimen-
sions of poverty—the number of people living in poverty (measured at poverty lines of
1.25$ and 2$ per day), the shortfall of poor people from these poverty lines, and income
inequality before and after redistribution. With an (unbalanced) panel dataset covering
86 low- and middle income countries during the time period 1982-2009, we confront the
issue of sample selection and explicitly control for model uncertainty. Our findings are
based on treatment effect regressions, which account for endogenous selection of coun-
tries into IMF programs. As this modeling approach allows to test for the existence of
selection bias, we compare the results to the outcome of OLS regressions with country
fixed effects for model specifications in which selection bias is not detected. In total,
we estimate 90 different treatment effect models for each poverty indicator and, in or-
der to make use of all the information obtained, average over the resulting parameters
with model weights that are proportional to the BIC. This allows to obtain results—
concerning the consequences of program participation on poverty and inequality that
are common to a large group of countries—that are not conditional on a single selected
model but are robust to different model specifications.
Although the findings of this study should be interpreted with the appropriate caution
we can be confident in stating that in our 1982-2009 sample the relatively bigger part of
the costs connected to the adjustment process inherent to IMF agreements is borne out
by lower income classes, leading to a worsening of income equality and a rise in poverty.
Participation in IMF programs is found to go hand in hand with an increase in poverty,
measured by the number of people living below poverty income, as well as by the income
shortfall of those people from the poverty line. The effect on poverty is strongest in the
year the program is implemented and declines as program participation is included in
the estimations with a one year time lag. The significant influence of an IMF agreement
on poverty vanishes when it enters the equations two years lagged.53 Concerning the
distribution of income, inequality, both, measured before and after redistribution rises
due to the implementation of IMF programs.54 Two years lagged program participation
52Performing the same estimations for income-group subsamples in a two-stage treatment effects frame-
work with equal model weights confirms the poverty increasing effect of concessional programs for low-
income countries, while we fail to detect significant results for lower-middle income countries. While we
find a statistically significant decrease in net inequality in lower-middle income countries, the results for
low-income countries are insignificant. Upper-middle income countries are not eligible for concessional
lending programs. The insignificance of the program effects might stem from the inefficiency of the
two-stage approach as compared to maximum likelihood estimates and a smaller sample size.
53The only exception to this is the program effect on the development of the income shortfall from
the poverty line of 2$ per day, which increases with the time lag with which program participation is
included.
54Martin & Segura-Ubiergo (2004) find that social expenditure on public health and education does
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ceases to significantly affect the income distribution.
Conducting the same analysis for the 2000-2009 sub period in order to see if the Fund’s
adoption of poverty alleviation in its agenda has been successful a different pattern is
observed. Program participation contemporaneously leads to a decrease in most poverty
indicators. The significant effect disappears as the program dummy is included with one
or two years time lag or even changes direction, leading to a increase in some of the 2$
line poverty indicators. Post-2000 IMF programs are found to have a (gross and net)
income inequality decreasing effect. This result is stable to the time lag with which pro-
gram participation enters the estimation. Although the introduction of the PRGF might
be a cause of this change in program effects, the analysis presented in this paper does
not provide a clear confirmation. Estimations of the effects of concessional programs
only reveal poverty increasing but inequality lowering impacts of this program type.
The IMF alludes that although there might exist negative impacts of adjustment poli-
cies on poverty due to a temporary contraction of economic activity in the short-run,
greater benefits to the poor are expected as a result of the restoration of macroeconomic
stability in the long-run (Ames et al. 2001). Our results provide a first indication that
detrimental consequences of IMF programs for poverty might die out moving away from
the short-run. The insight that income is distributed more equally in countries that
spent more years under IMF agreements in their past also points in that direction. On
the other hand, though, also beneficial implications of IMF programs for poverty seem
to disappear when the time horizon under consideration increases. The suggestion of
vanishing effects of IMF programs on poverty and inequality should, however, not be
taken as a definite declaration as, due to data constraints, we do not tackle longer-run
effects of IMF programs explicitly in this article. This study provides evidence that
the inclusion of poverty alleviation in the IMF’s agenda has led to the desired effects.
What is left to be answered in future investigation is the role that each of the economic
reforms that are connected to IMF agreements plays in driving the effect on poverty
and inequality, what would certainly further enrich this field of research. While in this
study we could shed some light on the short-run effects of IMF programs on poverty and
income equality, many questions remain to be answered in the future.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Selection equations
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reservest−1 + + + + +
Ln(GDP pc)t−1 + + + + +
Ln(GDP pc)t−1, squared + + + + +
Tradet−1 + + + + +
Debt Servicet−1 + + + + +
Vote in line with G7t−1 + + + + +
Countries under programt + + + + +
Past program yearst + + + + +
Ln(GDP)t−1 + +
Ln(GDP)t−1, squared + +
Change in GDP growtht−1 + +
GDP growtht−1 + +
Current account balancet−1 + +
NOTE: + indicates that the variable is included in the specification.
25
T
ab
le
2:
O
u
tc
om
e
eq
u
at
io
n
s
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)(
1
1
)(
1
2
)(
1
3
)(
1
4
)(
1
5
)(
1
6
)(
1
7
)(
1
8
)
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c)
t−
1
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
D
em
o
cr
a
cy
in
d
ex
t−
1
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
G
in
i
n
et
t−
1
(a
)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Y
ea
rs
b
ef
o
re
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
,
tr
en
d
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
P
ro
g
ra
m
y
ea
rs
t
,
tr
en
d
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
,
tr
en
d
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
u
n
d
er
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
P
a
st
p
ro
g
ra
m
y
ea
rs
t
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
V
o
te
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
G
7
t−
1
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c)
t−
1
,
sq
u
a
re
d
+
+
G
D
P
p
c
g
ro
w
th
t−
1
+
+
+
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
g
ro
w
th
t−
1
+
+
L
n
(I
n
v
es
tm
en
t)
t−
1
+
+
+
L
n
(T
ra
d
e)
t−
1
+
+
+
L
n
(T
ra
d
e)
t−
1
,
L
IC
+
+
+
L
n
(T
ra
d
e)
t−
1
,
M
IC
+
+
+
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
ra
te
g
ro
w
th
t−
1
+
+
+
>
2
0
0
%
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
t−
1
(b
)
+
+
+
L
n
(C
re
d
it
) t
−
1
+
+
+
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
t−
1
+
+
+
L
n
(I
n
fl
a
ti
o
n
) t
−
1
+
+
D
efl
a
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
t−
1
(c
)
+
+
+
H
y
p
er
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
t−
1
(c
)
+
+
+
N
a
tu
ra
l
re
so
u
rc
e
re
n
ts
t−
1
+
+
+
V
a
lu
e
a
d
d
ed
o
f
a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
t−
1
+
+
U
rb
a
n
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
t−
1
+
+
Y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
t−
1
+
+
L
if
e
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
t−
1
+
+
T
im
e
tr
en
d
t
+
+
N
O
T
E
:
+
in
d
ic
a
te
s
th
a
t
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
is
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
.
(a
)
T
h
e
va
ri
a
b
le
is
o
n
ly
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
m
o
d
el
s
w
it
h
p
ov
er
ty
g
a
p
s
o
r
h
ea
d
co
u
n
t
ra
ti
o
s
a
s
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
.
(b
)
W
e
a
d
d
a
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
w
it
h
d
ev
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
m
o
re
th
a
n
2
0
0
%
to
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
o
u
tl
ie
rs
.
(c
)
W
e
a
d
d
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
d
efl
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
h
y
p
er
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
.
26
Table 3: Poverty gaps and headcount ratios by program participation status
Poverty
gap 1.25$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 13 9.16 0.66 14.32 0.50 47.74
before 18 9.96 6.61 9.13 0.50 31.27
program 198 7.12 3.66 9.29 0.50 53.09
between 64 7.03 2.94 10.77 0.50 47.28
after 63 3.12 0.94 4.40 0.50 20.72
Total 356 6.62 3.00 9.27 0.50 53.09
Poverty
gap 2$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 13 15.78 3.23 19.22 1.29 61.65
before 18 18.83 11.87 15.97 0.50 52.42
program 198 14.68 9.74 14.50 0.50 67.22
between 64 13.87 8.53 15.73 0.08 64.07
after 63 7.98 3.50 9.87 0.50 40.84
Total 356 13.60 8.28 14.50 0.08 67.22
Headcount
ratio 1.25$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 13 20.89 3.22 25.62 2.00 78.59
before 18 26.09 15.22 23.79 2.00 78.10
program 196 19.67 12.62 20.49 2.00 88.52
between 63 18.41 11.03 21.71 2.00 86.43
after 63 10.72 3.53 13.94 2.00 60.18
Total 353 18.22 10.79 20.35 2.00 88.52
Headcount
ratio 2$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 13 33.03 12.31 28.86 6.84 89.31
before 18 39.92 27.04 29.84 2.00 93.37
program 198 34.82 26.80 26.47 2.00 96.57
between 64 31.77 22.59 27.70 2.00 95.41
after 63 22.23 15.13 22.62 2.00 84.62
Total 356 32.24 23.29 26.64 2.00 96.57
Table 4: Gini indexes by program participation status
Gini gross Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 76 53.72 54.23 6.78 40.32 68.51
before 102 44.95 44.14 9.48 29.10 70.10
program 658 45.68 45.56 8.20 27.52 72.33
between 237 47.25 47.50 8.09 30.62 70.19
after 200 43.99 43.75 6.03 33.13 57.14
Total 1273 46.13 46.08 8.19 27.52 72.33
Gini net Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 76 49.23 49.68 8.09 35.55 68.27
before 102 41.83 41.16 8.53 26.57 58.94
program 658 42.66 42.34 8.42 24.53 67.62
between 237 44.63 45.08 7.85 27.00 62.69
after 200 40.64 40.79 6.22 28.56 53.31
Total 1273 43.03 42.74 8.22 24.53 68.27
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Table 5: Selection equations - Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reservest−1 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP pc)t−1 1.709∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗ 1.654∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.347) (0.337) (0.329) (0.350)
Ln(GDP pc)t−1, squared -0.124∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Tradet−1 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Debt Servicet−1 0.008∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.007 0.008∗ 0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Vote in line with G7t−1 0.270∗ 0.255 0.257 0.277∗ 0.245
(0.159) (0.163) (0.160) (0.160) (0.163)
Countries under programt 0.004
∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Past program yearst 0.017
∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.159 0.208
(0.260) (0.258)
Ln(GDP)t−1, squared -0.004 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
GDP growtht−1 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Change in GDP growtht−1 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Current account balancet−1 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Europe & Central Asia (a) 0.494∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.058) (0.054) (0.051) (0.061)
Latin America & Carribean (a) 0.380∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.074) (0.067) (0.064) (0.077)
Middle East & North Africa (a) 0.139∗ 0.093 0.127 0.139∗ 0.084
(0.076) (0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.081)
Sub Saharan Africa (a) 0.228∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗
(0.059) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059) (0.067)
Asia Pacific (a) 0.014 0.030 0.014 0.012 0.026
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
N 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273
BIC 1519.941 1526.237 1520.731 1526.694 1535.132
NOTE: Probit estimations. Dependent variable: Program participation dummy.
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(a) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 6: Model averaging results - poverty indicators
Valid exculsion Poverty Poverty Headcount Headcount
restrictions Gap 1.25$ Gap 2$ Ratio 1.25$ Ratio 2$
τ
=
0
0.7015 *** 0.3343 *** 0.5208 *** 0.3099 ***
Min one (0.1940) (0.1248) (0.1373) (0.1065)
86 (96%) 90 (100%) 88 (98%) 87 (97%)
0.7419 *** 0.3643 *** 0.5225 *** 0.3276 ***
Min two (0.1932) (0.1114) (0.1335) (0.0964)
10 (11%) 21 (23%) 32 (36%) 13 (14%)
0.7419 *** 0.3643 *** 0.5225 *** 0.3276 ***
Vote in line with G7 (0.1932) (0.1114) (0.1335) (0.0964)
12 (13%) 21 (23%) 34 (38%) 22 (24%)
0.7015 *** 0.3343 *** 0.5208 *** 0.3099 ***
Past program years (0.194) (0.1248) (0.1373) (0.1065)
84 (93%) 90 (100%) 86 (96%) 78 (87%)
τ
=
1
0.6190 *** 0.4875 *** 0.4309 *** 0.2571 ***
Min one (0.2262) (0.1369) (0.1133) (0.094)
85 (94%) 90 (100%) 81 (90%) 85 (94%)
0.6190 *** 0.4875 *** 0.4309 *** 0.2571 ***
Past program years (0.2262) (0.1369) (0.1133) (0.094)
85 (94%) 90 (100%) 81 (90%) 85 (94%)
-0.1256 -0.1313 *
OLS fixed effects (0.0844) (0.0705)
3 (3%) 3 (3%)
τ
=
2
-0.1872 0.5051 *** 0.2116 0.1883
Min one (0.3372) (0.1792) (0.4205) (0.1319)
83 (92%) 88 (98%) 85 (94%) 87 (97%)
-0.3270 -0.5026
Min two (0.3474) (0.5609)
42 (47%) 4 (4%)
-0.1861 0.5051 *** 0.2116 0.1883
Past program years (0.3372) (0.1792) (0.4205) (0.1319)
79 (88%) 88 (98%) 85 (94%) 85 (94%)
-0.3266 -0.5026 0.1964 **
Countries under program (0.3432) (0.5609) (0.0848)
46 (51%) 4 (4%) 2 (2%)
-0.0201 0.0050 0.0787
OLS fixed effects (0.0793) (0.0614) (0.0497)
74 (82%) 51 (57%) 38 (42%)
NOTE: Averaged coefficient estimates of program participation, based on BIC.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Averaged standard errors in parentheses.
Number of averaged model specifications below, percentage of total in parentheses.
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Table 7: Model averaging results - income inequality indicators
Valid exculsion Gini Gini
restriction gross net
τ
=
0
2.5150 *** 3.0500 ***
Min one (0.8124) (0.9058)
39 (43%) 69 (77%)
2.9835 **
Min two (1.3104)
5 (6%)
2.5150 ***
Vote in line with G7 (0.8124)
34 (38%)
2.9834 **
Past program years (1.310247)
15 (17%)
2.4599 *** 3.0500 ***
Countries under program (0.9024) (0.9058)
5 (6%) 59 (66%)
-0.7919 -0.1728
OLS fixed effects (0.6351) (0.6553)
3 (3%) 7 (8%)
τ
=
1
3.4348 *** 2.8888 ***
Min one (0.8027) (0.9880)
5 (6%) 55 (61%)
2.7580 **
Min two (1.2503)
3 (3%)
2.8618 ***
Past program years (1.098)
10 (11%)
3.4348 *** 2.8888 ***
Countries under program (0.8027) (0.9880)
5 (6%) 48 (53%)
τ
=
2
2.2063
Min one (1.6704)
8 (9%)
2.2063
Past program years (1.6704)
8 (9%)
0.2092
OLS fixed effects (0.2499)
7 (8%)
NOTE: Averaged coefficient estimates of program participation, based on BIC.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Averaged standard errors in parentheses.
Number of averaged model specifications below, percentage of total in parentheses.
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Table 8: Model averaging results - programs after 2000
Poverty Poverty Headcount Headcount Gini Gini
Gap 1.25$ Gap 2$ Ratio 1.25$ Ratio 2$ gross net
τ
=
0
-0.0912 -0.7869 *** -0.4480 ** -0.6128 *** -3.4115 *** -2.7923 ***
Treatment effects (0.4192) (0.2109) (0.1984) (0.1492) (0.5992) (0.5022)
1 (1%) 66 (73%) 63 (70%) 24 (27%) 90 (100%) 90 (100%)
0.2575 -0.2894 0.0765 -0.2081
OLS fixed effects (0.1939) (0.2554) (0.1368) (0.1293)
52 (58%) 19 (21%) 16 (18%) 14 (16%)
τ
=
1
0.3968 * 0.3872 -3.1039 *** -1.8541 ***
Treatment effects (0.2376) (0.3609) (0.5411) (0.4474)
7 (8%) 54 (60%) 90 (100%) 90 (100%)
-0.0827 -0.1794 -0.0164 -0.0340
OLS fixed effects (0.1078) (0.1690) (0.0870) (0.0933)
59 (66%) 38 (42%) 8 (9%) 62 (69%)
τ
=
2
-0.2739 0.3444 0.0751 0.2964 * -3.0066 *** -2.1680 ***
Treatment effects (0.4071) (0.2599) (0.3231) (0.1735) (0.6216) (0.3355)
15 (17%) 70 (78%) 16 (18%) 85 (94%) 52 (58%) 55 (61%)
-0.1351 -0.0523 -0.0490 0.0474 0.5131 0.6797 ***
OLS fixed effects (0.1151) (0.1204) (0.0871) (0.0988) (0.3302) (0.2384)
72 (80%) 64 (71%) 34 (38%) 50 (56%) 36 (40%) 20 (22%)
Note: Averaged coefficient estimates of program participation, based on BIC. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Averaged standard errors in parentheses. Number of averaged model specifications below,
percentage of total in parentheses. Averaged effect of programs since 2000 if entered with τ=0,1,2 years
time lag. Treatment effects report the results of the averaging over treatment effects model specifications
in which at least one exclusion restriction is fulfilled.
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Table 9: Model averaging results - concessional programs
Poverty Poverty Headcount Headcount Gini Gini
Gap 1.25$ Gap 2$ Ratio 1.25$ Ratio 2$ gross net
τ
=
0
0.4602 * 0.5356 *** 0.4578 *** 0.3864 *** -3.3896 *** -1.7922 ***
Treatment effects (0.2524) (0.1367) (0.1475) (0.11) (0.6295) (0.5672)
90 (100%) 88 (98%) 89 (99%) 1 (1%) 57 (63%) 71 (79%)
0.0626 -0.0226 0.0359 -0.0797 -1.0176 *
OLS fixed effects (0.1693) (0.1096) (0.1331) (0.0867) (0.5855)
63 (70%) 60 (67%) 34 (38%) 14 (16%) 29 (32%)
τ
=
1
0.4194 0.4848 0.4961 * -0.3219 *** -2.5637 *** -0.9234 *
Treatment effects (0.4516) (0.6121) (0.2761) (0.1068) (0.5717) (0.4758)
90 (100%) 17 (19%) 44 (49%) 2 (2%) 63 (70%) 16 (18%)
-0.0044 0.0001 -0.0428 0.0116 -0.8591 * -0.7167 *
OLS fixed effects (0.1415) (0.0854) (0.1147) (0.0572) (0.5029) (0.4308)
81 (90%) 48 (53%) 59 (66%) 24 (27%) 1 (1%) 30 (33%)
τ
=
2
-0.1979 0.4919 *** 0.2343 0.1192 1.2600
Treatment effects (0.4479) (0.1691) (0.4038) (0.1573) (1.634)
83 (92%) 88 (98%) 85 (94%) 85 (94%) 10 (11%)
-0.0266 0.0162 0.0042 -0.7037 -0.7199
OLS fixed effects (0.1356) (0.0904) (0.0575) (0.614) (0.518)
75 (83%) 48 (53%) 38 (42%) 3 (3%) 16 (18%)
Note: Averaged coefficient estimates of concessional program participation, based on BIC. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Averaged standard errors in parentheses. Number of averaged model specifications
below, percentage of total in parentheses. Averaged effect of concessional programs (SAF, ESAF, PRGF)
if entered with τ=0,1,2 years time lag, controlling for non-concessional programs.
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Figure 1: IMF program participation
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A DATA
Information on participation in IMF programs was obtained from the IMF Member’s
Financial Data (IMF 2011j), which reports the participation in adjustment programs
beginning in 1982, thus limiting the scope of this analysis to start in that year. Data
on poverty as well as on economic variables were taken from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (2010). The poverty indicators used in this study
are poverty gaps and headcount ratios (both at poverty lines of $1.25 per day and $2 per
day). All financial and economic variables are reported in constant purchasing power
parity adjusted international dollars, or shares of GDP. The Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID) provides comparable Gini indexes of gross and net (of
redistribution) income inequality (Solt 2009). It overcomes the problem of comparabil-
ity that arise because of different definitions of income, recipient units, and population
coverage of the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database (WIID,
UNU-WIDER 2008). The SWIID incorporates data from different sources and uses a
missing-data algorithm to standardize the WIID. Dreher & Sturm (2012) and Dreher &
Walter (2010) provide data on UN General Assembly Voting and data on non-compliance
with IMF conditionality, while other political indicators are obtained from the Polity IV
dataset (Marshall et al. 2010). Education data are obtained from Barro & Lee (2010).
A detailed explanation of the variables can be found below.
A.1 List of variables
Variable Explanation Source
Poverty indicators:
Poverty gap $1.25: Poverty gap at $1.25 a day, purchasing power parity
(PPP) (%).
World Bank (2010).
Poverty gap $2: Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%). World Bank (2010).
Headcount ratio $1.25: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of
population).
World Bank (2010).
Headcount ratio$ 2: Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of
population).
World Bank (2010).
Gini gross: Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized
(square root scale) household gross (pre-tax, pre-
transfer) income, using Luxembourg Income Study
data as the standard.
Solt (2009).
Gini net: Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized
(square root scale) household disposable income, us-
ing Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard.
Solt (2009).
Explanatory variables:
> 200% depreciation dummy: Dummy variable equal to one if the annual deprecia-
tion exceeds 200%, one year lagged.
World Bank (2010),
own calculations.
Change in GDP growth: Annual change in GDP growth. World Bank (2010),
own calculations.
Countries under program: Number of other countries participating in an IMF
program.
IMF (2011j), own
calculations.
Credit, in logarithm: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), natural
logarithm, one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Current account balance: Current account balance (% of GDP), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Debt service: Total debt service (% of GNI). World Bank (2010).
Deflation dummy: Dummy variable equal to one for deflation in country
i in year t, one year lagged.
World Bank (2010),
own calculations.
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Democracy index: Polity2 index, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic)
to +10 (strongly democratic)
Marshall et al.
(2010).
Exchange rate growth: Annual growth rate in the official exchange rate (local
currency unit (LCU) per US$, period average), one
year lagged.
World Bank (2010),
own calculations.
GDP, in logarithm: GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
GDP growth: GDP growth (annual %), one year lagged. World Bank (2010).
GDP per capita, in logarithm: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $),
natural logarithm, one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
GDP per capita growth: GDP per capita growth (annual %), one year lagged. World Bank (2010).
Government consumption: General government final consumption expenditure
(% of GDP), one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Hyperinflation dummy: Dummy equal to one for hyperinflation in country i
in year t, one year lagged. Hyperinflation is defined
as inflation exceeding 50% in one year.
World Bank (2010),
own calculations.
Inflation, in logarithm: Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %), natural loga-
rithm, one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Investment, in logarithm: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth, total (years), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Natural resource rents: Total natural resources rents (% of GDP), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Past program years: Cumulative number of years that a country has been
under IMF agreement.
IMF (2011j), own
calculations.
Population growth: Population growth (annual %), one year lagged. World Bank (2010).
Program dummy: Dummy variable coded 1 for participation in an IMF
program (SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF, PRGF) of at least
4 months of year i and 0 otherwise.
IMF (2011j).
Program years, trend: Time trend counting consecutive program years of a
country.
IMF (2011j), own
calculations.
Reserves: Total reserves (% of total external debt), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Trade: Trade (% of GDP), one year lagged. World Bank (2010).
Trade LIC, natural logarithm: Interaction of Trade (% of GDP) in natural logarithm
and a dummy variable equal to one for low income
countries (LIC), one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Trade LMIC, natural logarithm: Interaction of Trade (% of GDP) in natural logarithm
and a dummy variable equal to one for lower middle
income countries (LMIC), one year lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Trend: Time trend starting in 1982. Own calculations.
Urban population: Urban population (% of total), one year lagged. World Bank (2010).
Value added of agriculture: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), one year
lagged.
World Bank (2010).
Vote in line with G7: Voting in line with G7, definition according to Barro
& Lee (2005), one year lagged.
Dreher & Sturm
(2012).
Years after program, trend: Time trend counting the years that passed since the
completion of the last IMF program until time t.
IMF (2011j), own
calculations.
Years before program, trend: Time trend counting in how many years from time t
on a program starts.
IMF (2011j), own
calculations.
Years of schooling: Average years of schooling, whole population, from
15 to 99, one year lagged.
Barro & Lee (2010).
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A.2 List of countries
Table A.2: Countries included in the study
1 Albania (g,p) 29 Guatemala (g,p) 58 Pakistan (g,p)
2 Algeria (g,p) 30 Guyana (g,p) 59 Panama (g,p)
3 Argentina (g,p) 31 Honduras (g,p) 60 Papua New Guinea (g,p)
4 Armenia (g,p) 32 India (g,p) 61 Paraguay (g,p)
5 Bangladesh (g,p) 33 Indonesia (g,p) 62 Peru (g,p)
6 Belize (g,p) 34 Iran, Islamic Rep. (g) 63 Philippines (g,p)
7 Benin (g,p) 35 Jamaica (g,p) 64 Poland (g,p)
8 Bolivia (g,p) 36 Jordan (g,p) 65 Romania (g,p)
9 Botswana (g,p) 37 Kazakhstan (g,p) 66 Russian Federation (g,p)
10 Brazil (g,p) 38 Kenya (g,p) 67 Rwanda (g,p)
11 Bulgaria (g,p) 39 Kyrgyz Republic (g,p) 68 Senegal (g,p)
12 Burundi (g,p) 40 Lao PDR (g,p) 69 Sierra Leone (g,p)
13 Cambodia (g,p) 41 Latvia (g,p) 70 South Africa (g,p)
14 Cameroon (g,p) 42 Lesotho (g,p) 71 Sri Lanka (g,p)
15 Central African 43 Liberia (g) 72 Swaziland (g,p)
Republic (g,p) 44 Lithuania (g,p) 73 Tajikistan (g,p)
16 Chile (g,p) 45 Malawi (g,p) 74 Tanzania (g,p)
17 China (g,p) 46 Malaysia (g,p) 75 Thailand (g,p)
18 Colombia (g,p) 47 Mali (g,p) 76 Togo (g,p)
19 Congo, Rep. (g,p) 48 Mauritania (g,p) 77 Tunisia (g,p)
20 Costa Rica (g,p) 49 Mauritius (g) 78 Turkey (g,p)
21 Cote d’Ivoire (g,p) 50 Mexico (g,p) 79 Uganda (g,p)
22 Dominican Republic (g,p) 51 Moldova (g,p) 80 Ukraine (g,p)
23 Egypt, Arab Rep. (g,p) 52 Mongolia (g,p) 81 Uruguay (g,p)
24 El Salvador (g,p) 53 Morocco (g,p) 82 Venezuela, RB (g,p)
25 Fiji (g) 54 Mozambique (g,p) 83 Vietnam (g,p)
26 Gabon (g,p) 55 Nepal (g,p) 84 Yemen, Rep. (g,p)
27 Gambia, The (g,p) 56 Nicaragua (g,p) 85 Zambia (g,p)
28 Ghana (g,p) 57 Niger (g,p) 86 Zimbabwe (g)
NOTE: Countries without any IMF program in the period 1982 to 2009 in bold.
(g) refers to countries with Gini observations.
(p) refers to countries with poverty observations.
A.3 Descriptive statistics
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Table A.5: Poverty and inequality by program participation status (2000-2009)
Poverty
gap 1.25$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 3 12.69 8.18 14.96 0.50 29.38
before 1 7.80 7.80 . 7.80 7.80
program 89 6.42 2.83 8.92 0.50 46.84
between 22 5.23 2.04 7.46 0.50 27.13
after 49 2.23 0.89 2.61 0.50 10.83
Total 164 5.13 1.94 7.70 0.50 46.84
Poverty
gap 2$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 3 21.84 18.31 22.44 1.37 45.84
before 1 13.42 13.42 . 13.42 13.42
program 89 13.43 8.06 14.15 0.50 64.38
between 22 10.76 6.28 13.59 0.08 45.80
after 49 6.24 3.45 6.96 0.50 30.41
Total 164 11.08 6.28 12.83 0.08 64.38
Headcount
ratio 1.25$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 3 30.35 26.20 30.64 2.00 62.85
before 1 17.23 17.23 . 17.23 17.23
program 88 18.01 10.80 20.01 2.00 88.52
between 22 14.76 6.88 19.34 2.00 64.60
after 49 8.17 3.39 9.32 2.00 41.64
Total 163 14.84 7.76 18.01 2.00 88.52
Headcount
ratio 2$ Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 3 43.91 42.90 36.62 7.81 81.02
before 1 28.10 28.10 . 28.10 28.10
program 89 32.44 22.28 26.28 2.00 96.57
between 22 25.43 16.42 27.29 2.00 85.42
after 49 18.77 13.97 18.05 2.00 75.60
Total 164 27.60 19.57 24.96 2.00 96.57
Gini gross Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 24 53.41 52.34 9.36 40.32 68.51
before 4 53.86 53.82 0.34 53.53 54.26
program 232 43.78 43.31 6.91 27.52 58.29
between 65 45.63 46.75 6.37 32.67 59.25
after 139 44.19 44.53 5.77 33.13 56.30
Total 464 44.75 44.90 7.00 27.52 68.51
Gini net Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
never 24 51.29 50.45 10.64 35.55 68.27
before 4 52.33 52.27 0.19 52.17 52.60
program 232 41.39 42.17 7.61 24.53 55.54
between 65 42.53 44.91 6.16 30.36 56.56
after 139 41.04 41.17 6.12 28.56 53.31
Total 464 42.05 42.34 7.54 24.53 68.27
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B MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
The inclusion of the variables that form part of the selection and the outcome equa-
tions in this study is motivated by previous research that deals with the determinants of
participation in IMF agreements on the one hand and on the driving factors of poverty
and income inequality on the other hand. This section provides a short overview of the
studies we refer to in this paper.
Tables B.1. to B.3. are build up in a similar way. Table B.2. and B.3. summarize
empirical work and provide for each study information concerning the sample of coun-
tries and the time period included, as well the specification of the dependent variable
and the estimation technique that is applied by the authors. The tables also summa-
rize the authors’ findings concerning the effects of the variables that also form part of
this study on the dependent variable together with their significance level, in order to
facilitate a comparison with the here presented work. Table B.3. on the determinants of
program participation additionally indicates which IMF programs have been taken into
consideration in the study. In contrast, Table B.1. summarizes theoretical studies and
surveys on the drivers of poverty and inequality and therefore leaves out the empirical
background but provides orientation concerning the expected theoretical effects.
Table B.1: Determinants of poverty and inequality - Theoretical studies and surveys
Gunter et al (2005) Kanbur (1987) Kuznets (1955)
Dependent variable poverty poverty inequality
Ln(GDP pc) +
Gini index +
Ln(GDP pc), squared -
GDP pc growth - -
Population growth +
Ln(Investment) +
Ln(Trade) +/- +
Exchange rate growth - -
Ln(Inflation) -
Value added of agriculture -
Urban population +
Morduch (1994) Nissanke & Thorbecke (2006)
Dependent variable poverty poverty
Gini index +
GDP pc growth -
Ln(Investment) +
Ln(Trade) +/-
Ln(Credit) -
Ln(Inflation) +
Natural resource rents +
Value added of agriculture - -
Urban population +
Years of schooling -
Note: Only variables that are included in this study are mentioned in the table.
- indicates a negative effect on the dependent variable, + indicates a positive effect, +/- indicates that the effect
is ambiguous.
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C MODEL DIAGNOSTICS
This section provides closer information about the models with the biggest influence on
the results of this study for the unrestricted sample. Table C.1. reports the distribution
of posterior model probabilities (whose calculation is based on the BIC) which are used
as model weights in the averaging process. The calculation of posterior model prob-
abilities is based on the results of the treatment effect regressions (see Section 3(b)).
The weights for the 15 best models (per poverty indicator and time lag with which the
program dummy enters the equations) that fulfill at least one exclusion restriction can
be found in the table. There are cases in which less than 15 model specifications fulfill
any of the exclusion restrictions. That is why model probabilities for a smaller number
of models can be found in the table.
Tables C.2. and C.3. report the treatment effect results for the three “best” models
with the highest posterior model probabilities for each poverty and income inequality
indicator. The dependent variable is shown in the first row, while in the second row the
model specification is reported. Model 3-2, for example, refers to the third specification
of the selection equation which is combined with the second specification of the outcome
equation. In addition to the regression coefficients, the tables report values for athro
and lnsigma, posterior model probabilities, the number the of observations that are
included in the regression, and the BIC. Lnsigma is the natural logarithm of σ, the
standard deviation of the error term from the outcome equation (see Section 3(a)).
Athrho represents Fisher’s z transformed correlation of the error terms of the selection
and the outcome equation or, put differently, the arc-hyperbolic tangent of ρ. The high
statistical significance of athrho indicates the presence of sample selection, which justifies
the use of treatment effect estimations as OLS would lead to biased results.
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Table C.1: Posterior model probabilities
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 1.25$
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 1.25$
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 1.25$
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 2$
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 2$
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Poverty gap 2$
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 1.25$
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 1.25$
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 1.25$
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 2$
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 2$
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Headcount ratio 2$
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Gini gross
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
1 2 3 4 5
Gini gross
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
Gini gross
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Gini net
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 5 10 15
Gini net
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
po
st
er
io
r m
od
el
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 2 4 6 8
Gini net
43
T
ab
le
C
.2
:
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
es
t
th
e
p
os
te
ri
or
m
o
d
el
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
-
P
ov
er
ty
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
1
.2
5
$
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
2
$
H
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
a
t
io
1
.2
5
$
H
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
a
t
io
2
$
M
o
d
e
l
3
-2
M
o
d
e
l
1
-2
M
o
d
e
l
3
-1
M
o
d
e
l
3
-8
M
o
d
e
l
1
-8
M
o
d
e
l
2
-8
M
o
d
e
l
1
-1
M
o
d
e
l
1
-2
M
o
d
e
l
1
-7
M
o
d
e
l
3
-8
M
o
d
e
l
1
-8
M
o
d
e
l
3
-2
Outcomeequation
G
in
i
n
e
t t
−
1
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
4
8
*
*
*
0
.0
4
1
*
*
*
0
.0
4
1
*
*
*
0
.0
4
1
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
Y
e
a
rs
b
e
fo
re
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
1
4
*
-0
.0
1
3
*
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
P
ro
g
ra
m
y
e
a
rs
t
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
2
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
7
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
0
.0
1
7
*
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
2
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
0
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
Y
e
a
rs
a
ft
e
r
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
9
*
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
V
o
te
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
G
7
t
−
1
-0
.8
7
6
*
*
-0
.8
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
9
8
*
-0
.3
1
9
-0
.3
3
1
-0
.3
2
0
-0
.3
4
1
-0
.4
6
1
*
-0
.3
5
9
-0
.3
1
3
-0
.3
1
7
-0
.2
0
0
(0
.3
4
5
)
(0
.3
4
6
)
(0
.3
5
5
)
(0
.2
6
3
)
(0
.2
6
2
)
(0
.2
6
2
)
(0
.2
6
4
)
(0
.2
6
3
)
(0
.2
6
9
)
(0
.1
9
6
)
(0
.1
9
6
)
(0
.2
0
4
)
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
u
n
d
e
r
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
P
a
st
p
ro
g
ra
m
y
e
a
rs
t
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c
) t
−
1
-6
.0
2
7
*
*
*
-5
.6
3
7
*
*
*
-1
.0
8
4
*
*
*
-1
.1
2
5
*
*
*
-1
.1
4
6
*
*
*
-1
.1
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.9
6
0
*
*
*
-3
.2
0
3
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
1
*
*
*
-0
.8
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.8
8
3
*
*
*
2
.2
3
5
*
*
(1
.4
1
0
)
(1
.4
0
7
)
(0
.2
4
7
)
(0
.1
6
4
)
(0
.1
6
4
)
(0
.1
6
5
)
(0
.2
0
4
)
(1
.1
3
6
)
(0
.2
0
7
)
(0
.1
4
7
)
(0
.1
4
9
)
(1
.0
5
2
)
D
e
m
o
c
ra
c
y
in
d
e
x
t
−
1
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
1
8
*
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c
) t
−
1
,
sq
u
a
re
d
0
.3
0
6
*
*
*
0
.2
8
1
*
*
*
0
.1
3
8
*
*
-0
.1
9
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.0
7
0
)
(0
.0
6
7
)
L
n
(C
re
d
it
) t
−
1
-0
.2
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.2
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.2
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
3
)
(0
.0
6
3
)
(0
.0
6
3
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
ra
te
g
ro
w
th
t
−
1
-0
.0
4
2
*
(0
.0
2
5
)
>
2
0
0
%
d
e
p
re
c
ia
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
t
−
1
0
.1
3
2
(0
.1
4
9
)
P
ro
g
ra
m
d
u
m
m
y
t
0
.6
9
2
*
*
*
0
.7
6
1
*
*
*
0
.6
2
6
*
*
*
0
.3
2
4
*
*
0
.3
6
6
*
*
*
0
.3
4
8
*
*
*
0
.5
0
3
*
*
*
0
.5
3
1
*
*
*
0
.5
8
4
*
*
*
0
.3
0
3
*
*
*
0
.3
3
7
*
*
*
0
.2
2
5
*
(0
.1
8
6
)
(0
.1
9
5
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.1
1
1
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.1
2
7
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.1
4
8
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.1
2
5
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
2
7
.4
0
6
*
*
*
2
5
.8
6
4
*
*
*
8
.0
6
3
*
*
*
9
.4
3
5
*
*
*
9
.5
3
8
*
*
*
9
.6
4
1
*
*
*
8
.6
5
3
*
*
*
1
7
.4
4
7
*
*
*
8
.7
0
5
*
*
*
8
.7
1
5
*
*
*
8
.8
5
8
*
*
*
-3
.0
3
0
(5
.5
0
4
)
(5
.4
8
6
)
(1
.6
0
2
)
(1
.0
9
5
)
(1
.1
0
9
)
(1
.1
1
7
)
(1
.2
8
2
)
(4
.4
1
1
)
(1
.2
8
9
)
(0
.9
4
8
)
(0
.9
6
3
)
(3
.9
9
1
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Selectionequation
R
e
se
rv
e
s t
−
1
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c
) t
−
1
6
.5
8
7
*
*
*
7
.1
3
5
*
*
*
5
.4
0
6
*
*
*
6
.4
5
5
*
*
*
7
.1
7
2
*
*
*
7
.5
6
3
*
*
*
6
.0
6
8
*
*
*
6
.8
0
4
*
*
*
6
.1
1
8
*
*
*
6
.9
0
6
*
*
*
7
.6
6
3
*
*
*
5
.8
5
8
*
*
*
(1
.7
8
8
)
(1
.6
4
4
)
(1
.7
4
6
)
(1
.9
7
3
)
(1
.7
7
5
)
(1
.9
4
2
)
(1
.5
3
4
)
(1
.5
7
7
)
(1
.4
9
0
)
(1
.7
9
9
)
(1
.6
8
2
)
(1
.8
6
8
)
L
n
(G
D
P
p
c
) t
−
1
,
sq
u
a
re
d
-0
.4
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.4
9
2
*
*
*
-0
.3
8
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
0
0
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
7
2
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
0
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
1
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.1
2
2
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.1
2
0
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
9
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.1
0
5
)
(0
.1
1
6
)
T
ra
d
e
t
−
1
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
D
e
b
t
S
e
rv
ic
e
t
−
1
0
.0
3
7
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
0
.0
3
8
*
*
0
.0
3
7
*
0
.0
3
7
*
0
.0
3
6
*
0
.0
5
1
*
*
*
0
.0
5
0
*
*
*
0
.0
5
2
*
*
*
0
.0
4
0
*
0
.0
4
1
*
0
.0
4
3
*
*
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
V
o
te
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
G
7
t
−
1
0
.8
4
5
1
.0
5
9
*
0
.8
5
1
0
.9
4
8
1
.2
0
4
*
1
.2
5
1
*
1
.0
7
1
*
1
.0
8
5
*
1
.0
7
7
*
1
.1
3
2
1
.3
4
5
*
*
1
.1
2
4
(0
.6
3
4
)
(0
.6
1
8
)
(0
.6
3
3
)
(0
.7
0
8
)
(0
.6
9
3
)
(0
.7
1
6
)
(0
.6
2
4
)
(0
.6
2
4
)
(0
.6
0
6
)
(0
.6
9
1
)
(0
.6
7
4
)
(0
.6
9
4
)
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
u
n
d
e
r
p
ro
g
ra
m
t
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
P
a
st
p
ro
g
ra
m
y
e
a
rs
t
0
.0
4
6
*
*
0
.0
3
1
*
0
.0
4
6
*
*
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
0
.0
3
8
*
*
0
.0
3
2
*
0
.0
3
2
*
0
.0
2
8
*
0
.0
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
0
.0
5
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
L
n
(G
D
P
) t
−
1
-1
.4
3
4
(1
.3
6
3
)
L
n
(G
D
P
) t
−
1
,
sq
u
a
re
d
0
.0
2
4
(0
.0
2
6
)
G
D
P
g
ro
w
th
t
−
1
-0
.0
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
in
G
D
P
g
ro
w
th
t
−
1
0
.0
4
0
*
*
*
0
.0
3
7
*
*
0
.0
4
0
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-2
3
.2
4
9
*
*
*
-2
6
.0
1
3
*
*
*
-1
8
.5
4
3
*
*
*
-2
2
.6
9
4
*
*
*
-2
6
.2
9
9
*
*
*
-7
.6
9
8
-2
1
.9
8
7
*
*
*
-2
4
.9
2
7
*
*
*
-2
2
.2
6
6
*
*
*
-2
4
.5
6
5
*
*
*
-2
8
.2
6
7
*
*
*
-2
0
.4
0
6
*
*
*
(7
.1
6
7
)
(6
.5
2
6
)
(7
.0
1
5
)
(7
.9
7
7
)
(7
.1
3
8
)
(1
6
.8
2
1
)
(6
.0
9
6
)
(6
.2
7
0
)
(5
.9
0
2
)
(7
.2
5
1
)
(6
.7
4
8
)
(7
.5
7
6
)
R
e
g
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
a
th
rh
o
-1
.0
3
7
*
*
*
-1
.0
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.9
9
6
*
*
*
-0
.5
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.5
5
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
1
4
*
*
*
-1
.0
5
9
*
*
*
-1
.0
7
3
*
*
*
-1
.2
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.7
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.7
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.6
1
1
*
*
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.2
5
4
)
(0
.2
7
2
)
(0
.1
8
2
)
(0
.1
3
5
)
(0
.1
3
3
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(0
.2
1
7
)
(0
.2
7
1
)
(0
.2
3
1
)
(0
.1
6
8
)
(0
.2
7
7
)
ln
si
g
m
a
-0
.6
7
7
*
*
*
-0
.6
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.6
7
7
*
*
*
-1
.0
0
3
*
*
*
-0
.9
9
0
*
*
*
-1
.0
0
0
*
*
*
-0
.9
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.9
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.9
0
5
*
*
*
-1
.2
4
7
*
*
*
-1
.2
2
9
*
*
*
-1
.2
7
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
1
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
6
7
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.0
6
8
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
P
o
st
e
ri
o
r
m
o
d
e
l
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
0
.6
0
5
0
.1
4
4
0
.0
5
0
0
.7
3
0
0
.2
2
4
0
.0
2
2
0
.2
4
0
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
3
0
.5
2
3
0
.3
3
2
0
.0
4
4
N
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
3
3
5
3
3
5
3
3
5
6
3
5
6
3
5
6
B
IC
1
3
1
3
.9
7
8
1
3
1
6
.8
4
8
1
3
1
8
.9
5
0
1
1
7
2
.5
3
7
1
1
7
4
.9
0
0
1
1
7
9
.5
5
0
1
1
0
8
.2
2
4
1
1
1
0
.1
9
9
1
1
1
0
.3
5
2
9
6
1
.1
9
8
9
6
2
.1
0
6
9
6
6
.1
4
7
N
O
T
E
:
B
es
t
th
re
e
m
o
d
el
s
fo
r
ea
ch
p
ov
er
ty
in
d
ic
a
to
r
re
p
o
rt
ed
.
P
ro
g
ra
m
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
en
te
rs
co
n
te
m
p
o
ra
n
eo
u
sl
y
(τ
=
0
).
44
Table C.3: Specifications with highest the posterior model probability - Inequality
Gini gross Gini net
Model 1-5 Model 4-5 Model 1-8 Model 3-15 Model 1-15 Model 4-15
O
u
tc
o
m
e
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
Years before programt 0.032 0.032 0.046 0.112** 0.108** 0.108**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Program yearst 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.164*** -0.017 -0.020 -0.020
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Years after programt 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.101** 0.047 0.059 0.060
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Vote in line with G7t−1 2.233 2.229 1.939 1.999 1.971 1.971
(1.403) (1.403) (1.457) (1.222) (1.234) (1.234)
Countries under programt -0.024** -0.024** -0.029** 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Past program yearst -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.427*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.209***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Ln(GDP pc)t−1 3.493*** 3.486*** 4.021*** 3.092*** 2.937*** 2.937***
(0.804) (0.802) (0.788) (0.662) (0.655) (0.655)
Democracy indext−1 -0.084** -0.084** -0.061 -0.066** -0.066** -0.066**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Ln(Investment)t−1 2.686*** 2.702***
(0.510) (0.512)
Ln(Credit)t−1 0.742***
(0.179)
Life expectancyt−1 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.331***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Program dummy t 2.515*** 2.502*** 2.809*** 2.951*** 3.187*** 3.191***
(0.812) (0.819) (0.752) (0.889) (0.910) (0.916)
Constant 29.536*** 29.520*** 32.766*** 17.435*** 18.159*** 18.152***
(4.213) (4.223) (4.326) (4.419) (4.371) (4.365)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
S
e
le
c
ti
o
n
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
Reservest−1 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(GDP pc)t−1 4.580*** 4.587*** 4.578*** 4.247*** 4.242*** 4.240***
(0.803) (0.804) (0.794) (0.839) (0.819) (0.822)
Ln(GDP pc)t−1, squared -0.327*** -0.328*** -0.327*** -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.307***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Tradet−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt Servicet−1 0.021** 0.021** 0.019* 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Vote in line with G7t−1 0.701* 0.707* 0.693* 0.478 0.456 0.454
(0.413) (0.414) (0.412) (0.446) (0.454) (0.456)
Countries under programt 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.007* 0.009** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Past program yearst 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
GDP growtht−1 -0.035***
(0.010)
Change in GDP growtht−1 0.020**
(0.009)
Current account balancet−1 0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant -16.872*** -16.880*** -16.882*** -15.261*** -15.406*** -15.403***
(3.157) (3.157) (3.124) (3.301) (3.217) (3.221)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
athrho -0.722*** -0.720*** -0.779*** -0.733*** -0.780*** -0.781***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.162) (0.208) (0.211) (0.213)
lnsigma 1.222*** 1.221*** 1.243*** 1.139*** 1.153*** 1.153***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.068) (0.070) (0.071)
Posterior model probability 0.970 0.029 0.001 0.578 0.406 0.011
N 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273
BIC 8608.036 8615.069 8622.570 8393.817 8394.526 8401.671
NOTE: Best three models for each income inequality indicator reported. Program participation
enters contemporaneously (τ = 0).
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